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Abstract: 
In this article we propose a bilateral dumping model in which the minimum access level is 
endogenous.  Regions compete with one another using Cournot conjectures and engage in 
interregional dumping as in Brander and Krugman’s (1983) reciprocal dumping model. 
International trade is hindered by restrictive Tariff rate Quota (TRQs). The model features two 
regions and one product. We derive the conditions under which it is optimal to observe 
interregional trade and those under which trade does not exist. The results show that the world 
price and the difference in production costs between regions play an important role in 
determining whether bilateral trade exists. In the presence of bilateral trade, the region with 
the largest market size will obtain the largest share of import volumes permitted under the 
minimum access system while in the absence of interregional trade, the distribution of import 
permits between regions will also depends on the product cost asymmetry. When only the most 
efficient region exports to the least efficient region, production costs asymmetry, transaction 
costs and world price level determine whether the smaller or larger region obtains the larger 
share of product import allowed under minimum access commitment. In all cases, we show that 
in a country like Canada, creation of “artificial barriers” to interprovincial trade of products 
under supply management system lowers the welfare of at least one of the regions, along with 
the global welfare. 
Keywords: Minimum access, reciprocal dumping, cost asymmetry  
 
Résumé:  
Dans cet article, nous proposons un modèle de dumping bilatéral avec un niveau d'accès 
minimum endogène. Les régions se concurrencent entre elles en utilisant des conjectures à la 
Cournot et pratiquent du dumping interrégional selon le modèle de dumping réciproque  de 
Brander et Krugman (1983). Le commerce international est entravé par des contingents 
tarifaires. Le modèle comporte deux régions et un produit. Nous dérivons les conditions pour 
lesquelles il est optimal d’observer des échanges interrégionaux et celles pour lesquelles le 
commerce n'existe pas. Les résultats obtenus montrent que le prix mondial et de la différence 
des coûts de production entre les régions jouent un rôle important dans l’existence ou non du 
commerce bilatéral. En présence de commerce bilatéral, la région ayant le marché le plus 
important aura les parts les plus importantes de l’accès minimum tandis qu’en l’absence de 
commerce interrégional, les affectations de l’accès minimum dépendront également du 
paramètre de coût. Lorsque seule la région la plus efficace exporte vers la région la moins 
efficace, l’asymétrie des coûts de production, les coûts de transaction et le prix mondial 
déterminent si la plus grande part des importations de produits autorisés en vertu de 
l'engagement d'accès minimum va ou non à la région la plus peuplée. Dans tous les cas, nous 
montrons que dans un pays comme le Canada, la mise en place de «barrières artificielles» au 
commerce interprovincial des produits relevant du système de gestion de l'offre diminue le 
bien-être d'au moins l'une des régions et le bien-être global. 
Mots clés: Accès minimum, dumping réciproque, asymétrie des coûts 
 
Classification JEL: F120, Q170, R120 
Production cost asymmetry, minimum access and reciprocal dumping 
 
 
1 Introduction  
Under the Uruguay Accord, non-tariff barriers (quotas) have been converted into tariff 
barriers in the agri-food sector. To ensure that tariffs are not completely protectionist, World 
Trade Organization (WTO) member nations have created a system of tariff rate quotas (TRQs) 
which is a combination of tariffs and quotas. A small quantity of a product (minimum access) 
can be imported at a minimum tariff (intra-quota tariff), whereas imports that exceed the quantity 
permitted by minimum access to the market are subject to a higher, often prohibitive tariff. For 
example, Canada protects its markets from import competition in the egg, poultry and dairy 
sectors by imposing a minimum tariff on foreign imports as long as they are less than or equal to 
the commitments made under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and  WTO.
1
 
Beyond this level, imports are subject to much higher tariffs (for example up to 230% for 
chicken). In its latest evaluation of the European Union trade policy, the WTO reported that in 
2010, the European Union had notified 112 tariff rate quotas in the agricultural sector, 34 of 
which were totally used, and 10 used between 80% and 99% (WTO, 2013).  In the United States, 
this mechanism prevails in the dairy
2
 and sugar
3
 sectors. Several other countries use such 
instruments, which justifies the will of some WTO member nations to reduce extreme tariffs 
and/or increase minimum access. Higher tariffs should be reduced in a larger proportion than 
lower tariffs. However, the revised draft modalities of July 2008 recognizes the concept of 
                                                 
1
 See the website of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada at http://www.international.gc.ca/controls-
controles/prod/agri/index.aspx?menu_id=3. Accessed September 4, 2013. 
2
 See the USDA website at: http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/imports/usdairy.asp . Accessed September 4, 2013.  
3
 See the USDA website at http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/imports/ussugar.asp. Accessed September 4, 2013. 
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sensitive products,
4
  for which countries are not obliged to apply negotiated tariff reductions. 
Minimum access should then be increased to compensate for the lesser reduction of tariffs.
5
  The 
study of the consequences of an increase in minimum access and therefore levels of optimality in 
terms of producer surplus, consumer surplus and global welfare is therefore pertinent. 
The prevalence of import quotas in several countries and various economic sectors
6
 has spawned 
rich literature on this question, including recent works by Chao and Yu (1991), Feenstra (1995), 
Maggie and Rodriguez-Clare (2000), Kreickmeier (2005) and Chao et al. (2010). In the agri-food 
sector specifically, several studies have analyzed the impact of import quotas on a country's 
welfare using modeling approaches of varying complexity. Gervais and Lapan (2001) perform a 
dynamic analysis of the effects of tariff rate quotas, whereas Gervais and Lapan (2002) introduce 
uncertainty in their model. Pouliot and Larue (2012) consider the segments of production, 
processing and retail. These authors show that an increase in TRQs defined as a fraction of 
internal production can lead to an increase in retailers’ internal prices if the price of imports is 
between the unit production cost and firms’ internal price upstream.  Larue, Gervais and Pouliot 
(2008) analyze a situation in which local production is controlled by a monopoly (e.g. 
agricultural marketing board) with the possibility of restricting local producers’ supply. The 
authors show that at high price levels, the increase in minimum access commitments is the 
preferred trade policy option.   
                                                 
4
 See the WTO website at  http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/meet08_e.htm . Accessed September 4, 2013. 
5
 See draft text at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/chair_texts08_e.htm. Accessed September 3, 2013. 
6
 See WTO site at http://tariffanalysis.wto.org/report/TariffQuotas.aspx for the agricultural sector. This situation was 
also observed in other economic sectors.   Deardorff and Stern (1999, tables 3.1 and 3.2) report that in 1993, in the 
United States all non-tariff barriers and quotas (as measured by frequency ratios) were 22.9% and 18.1% 
respectively, for all products. The corresponding figures for the European Union were 23.7% and 17.2%.   
 3 
In both Canada and the European Union, import management involves not only allocating 
imports under minimum access to different provinces/countries, but also controlling production 
to guarantee a sufficiently high domestic price. National production is allocated to different 
regions/countries, each of which should source mainly on its local market. In Canada, supply 
management bodies have thus been put in place to ensure effective allocation of production 
quotas between provinces and avoid interprovincial “trade wars.”7 However, data on 
interprovincial trade of products under supply management indicate that this trade is generally 
increasing. Figures 1.a and 1.b present, respectively, the evolution of Canadian interprovincial 
trade in the shell egg and live chicken sectors.   
Ideally, production quotas should be distributed to minimize production and transaction costs, in 
order to satisfy the demand of consumers in different regional markets.  Using game theory, 
Larue and Lambert (2012) explain why Canadian producers and processors engage in 
interprovincial trade at the risk of attracting legislators’ attention, and paradoxically, ultimately 
lowering their profit. Businesses operate outside of their province even if they are likely to earn a 
lower profit than if they stayed in their respective province. Bayliss and Furtan (2003) use data 
on Canadian dairy production to show that provinces do not cooperate even in cases where there 
is a mutual interest, as in the case of lobbying the federal government to put trade barriers in 
place. Furtan, Sauer and Jensen (2009) observe a similar situation for European Common 
agricultural policy. In both Canada and the European Union, the situation is therefore similar to 
                                                 
7 For example, Chicken Farmers of Canada (CFC) is in charge of administering the national production system. CFC 
determines the national production level and distributes this production to the provinces based on requests it receives 
from provincial trade boards.  The Canadian Broiler Hatching Egg Marketing Agency (CBHEMA), Egg Farmers of 
Canada (EFC) and Turkey Farmers of Canada (TFC) are the national bodies that govern their respective sectors at 
the national level.  The Canadian Dairy Commission (CDC) sets support prices for butter and milk powder and 
chairs the Canadian Milk Supply Management Committee (CMSMC), which sets the national objective for milk 
production under the National Milk Marketing Plan. See the Canadian Justice Department website for the Farm 
Products Agencies Act.   http://lois-laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/F-4/ / Accessed February 18, 2013. 
 4 
bilateral dumping model as proposed by Brander and Krugman (1983), in which trade can exist 
even in the absence of a comparative advantage of either country
8
; the gains exceed the 
additional transport costs. In this type of model, it is impossible to determine a priori the net gain 
in terms of welfare for a situation in which various regions (or countries) engage in bilateral 
dumping (Krugman, 1989).  
In the European Union, several import quota management systems coexist (WTO, 2013). For 
some production, they are reassigned to different countries and import permits are consequently 
managed by importers in these states.
9
 For other production, import quotas are managed 
according to the first-come first-served principle or on a historical basis. For the European 
Union, it is therefore important not only to be able to determine the optimal minimum access 
level, but also optimal national assignments of imports eligible for the minimum access system.  
This paper is based on the bilateral dumping model of Brander and Krugman (1983). Our 
analysis innovates by applying the concept of bilateral dumping to interregional trade and by 
analyzing the impact of minimum access levels on the welfare of different regions.   
We derive the conditions under which it is optimal to observe interregional trade and those for 
which trade does not exist. The central message of our paper is that even if countries that have 
made minimum access commitments allow their production between regions such that trade is 
strictly minimized, it can still be optimal to observe interregional trade. World price and differing 
marginal production costs between regions play an important role here. “Artificial” barriers to 
trade between different regions/countries reduce global welfare. For a low (high) world price, the 
                                                 
8
 Friberg and Ganslandt (2008) generalize the model of Brander and Krugman (1983) by introducing product 
differentiation. Saggi and Yildiz (2011) provide a recent application. 
9
 However, in dairy production, production quotas are scheduled to end in 2015, whereas the production system 
under supply management continues in the sugar sector (WTO, 2013).  
 5 
minimum access level maximizing permit holders’ rent will be higher (lower) than the minimum 
access level maximizing global welfare. Further, the greater (lesser) the marginal cost asymmetry 
between regions, the higher (lower) the maximum world price for which the optimal level of 
minimum access of permit holders compared with the price that maximizes global welfare. Also, 
when the most efficient region exports to the least efficient region and not the inverse, marginal 
production costs asymmetry, transaction costs and the world price determine whether the smaller 
or the larger region will obtain the largest share of import permits.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model and in 
section 3 we analyze the situation in which minimum access level is optimal, and allocations of 
national production are such that interregional trade exists.  Section 4 defines the conditions 
under which only one region exports to the other region, whereas Section 5 describes conditions 
under which there is no bilateral dumping.
10
 Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Model  
Let us assume a model with two regions, 1,2i  ; belonging to a single country plus the 
rest of the world. To satisfy a certain demand for a good, the country may import this good at 
international price wp  plus the applied tariff, or it can produce it locally in both regions. We 
assume that the country adopts a minimum access import system M distributed between the two 
regions such that:   
ii
M M   (1) 
                                                 
10
 We do not present three other possibilities, namely that where: (i) the producer in region 2 acts as a monopoly on 
the market of each region; (ii) the producer in region 2 acts as a monopoly on the market of its region, and sales of 
the two regions are zero on the market of region 1; and (iii) nothing is produced locally. These results are available 
upon request.   
 6 
where iM  represents the portion of volumes authorized under minimum access intended for 
region i . Further, we consider that without loss of generality, intra-quota tariffs are zero,
11
 
whereas extra-quota tariffs are sufficiently prohibitive; imports are only those allowed under the 
minimum access system.   
Each region i  produces a single good according to a technology with constant returns to 
scale. The production cost function in region i  is defined by: 
 i iG y gy  with  
1              for  1
0,1         for  2
i
i


 

 
 (2) 
Where g and iy represent the marginal production cost and the quantity produced in region i  
respectively. The parameter   measures the degree of production cost asymmetry between the 
two regions. Therefore, the marginal production cost is lower in region 2. Further, we assume 
that interregional and bilateral trade is possible; 
ijt  represents sales from region i  in region j . 
The unit cost of transport between regions i and j is represented by the positive constant 
ijc  such 
that 0iic   and ij jic c c  . Each region must satisfy the following two constraints i : 
     ,    1,2   ji i ij t M z i   (3) 
     ,      1,2   i ijjy t i   (4) 
Where the variable zi represents the quantity demanded in region i. According to constraint (3), 
each region i must ensure that the quantity demanded locally does not exceed the sales of both 
regions plus the import volume permitted under minimal minimum access.  Constraint (4) 
                                                 
11
 This is the case of most products under supply management in Canada, for example, given that a very large 
portion of imports come from the United States.   Intra-quota tariffs are thus zero under NAFTA. See the website of 
Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada at http://www.international.gc.ca/controls-
controles/prod/agri/index.aspx?menu_id=3. Accessed September 4, 2013. 
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ensures for each region i that the sum of the quantity sold locally and that sold in the second 
region cannot exceed local production. 
Let us assume a representative consumer with an additively separable utility function defined 
over a continuum of goods indexed by  , which varies along the unit interval:  0,1  . We then 
assume that the utility function is: 
     
1
0
0, 0U z u z d u u           (5) 
Where  z   is the individual’s demand in sector  . Utility is maximized subject to the budget 
constraint and so the first-order conditions give the inverse demand functions for each region. 
Following Neary (2003) and Neary and Tharakan (2012), we assume that each sub-utility 
function is quadratic:  
     
21 ˆˆ
2
u z az bz        (6) 
Considering only one good, the inverse demand functions and the marginal utility of income are: 
 
2
ˆˆ1 ˆˆ     and    ,
p
p
a bI
p a bz p I


 

      
 (7) 
Where the parameter p is the price,
p is the mean of prices and 
2
p  is their (uncentered) 
variance. Hence, a rise in income, a rise in the (uncentered) variance of prices, or a fall in the 
mean of prices all reduce   and thus shift the demand function for each good outwards. Firms, 
however, take   as fixed, so the perceived or subjective inverse demand functions are linear.12 
                                                 
12
 As mentioned by Neary (2003), oligopoly models with linear demand functions are easy to solve in partial 
equilibrium. 
 8 
Aggregating over all L  households13 and imposing a market clearing condition imply that the 
inverse demands are:
14
 
 
1d
i i ip a a z

   (8) 
Where 
ˆ
0
a
a

   and  
1
ˆ
0i
i
b
a
L



  . The parameter i  is a measure of the relative market 
size. Without loss of generality, we assume that 1 1   and 2  , with  1  .  
We assume that the two regions engage in bilateral dumping. They compete à la  Cournot  on the 
market of each region. The inverse demand that they face in region i is therefore denoted as:  
    1 1di i i i jijp a a M a t 
 
     (9) 
The game is played in two steps. In the first step, the country selects the minimum access 
level that maximizes the total welfare of both regions. The welfare of each region is the sum of 
the producer and consumer surplus and import permit holders’ rent. In the second step, each 
region determines the sales that maximize its profits, and therefore the total quantity produced. 
The problem is solved using backward induction, and is presented in the following section. 
 
3. Optimality of the minimum access level in a bilateral trade context 
The profit maximization program of the producer in region 1 that sells its product in both 
regions is:       
    
1
1 12 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1
= 
j
j j j ij j j j jj i j jt
max a a M a t t g t c t  
 
   
        (10) 
                                                 
13
 Neary (2002) also shows that quadratic specification is a special case of the Gorman polar form.  Hence it 
aggregates perfectly over different regions, provided they have the same b parameter. 
14
 Motta and Norman (1996), Haufler and Wooton (1999) and Liang, Hwang and Mai (2006) also use these demand 
functions to exhibit asymmetric market size.  
 9 
The first-order condition of the maximization problem given by (10) is: 
       
1 1 1
1
2 1 1
1
2 0j j j j j j j
j
a a M a t a t g c
t

  
  
      

 (= 0 for 
1 0jt  )        (11) 
Equation (11) lets us obtain the reaction functions of the producer in region 1: 
   1 1 2 / 2j j j j jt a a g c M t      for 1,2j   
Similarly, for the producer in region 2, we obtain    2 2 1 / 2j j j j jt a a g c M t      . By 
simultaneously solving all of the reaction functions, we determine the solutions of 
1 jt  and 2 jt  
given by:   
        
        
1
1 1 2
1
2 2 1
2 / 3
2 / 3
j j j j j j
j j j j j j
t a a g c g c a M
t a a g c g c a M
  
  




      


      

        ,    for j=1,2  (12) 
According to (12), sales depend negatively on minimum access level. An increase in minimum 
access lowers the demand that the local producer faces, which decreases sales. Further, sales 
from one of the regions to the other region depend on the degree of production cost asymmetry 
measured by the parameter . We have assumed that region 2 is more efficient. An improvement 
in production efficiency in region 2 favors an increase in local sales in this region ( 22 0t    ) 
and development of unilateral interregional trade (from region 2 to region 1) because 
21 0t    . In contrast, improving production efficiency in region 2 reduces local sales in 
region 1 and sales of region 1 in region 2 simultaneously ( 12 0t    and 11 0t    ). Lastly, 
as expected, transaction costs negatively influence sales ( 0ij ijt c    with i j ) whereas market 
size has a positive effect ( 0ij jt     with i j ). By using expressions of sales in different 
regions given by (12), the constraints given by equations (3) and (4) and the demand function 
 10 
given by equation (9), it is possible to deduce the quantity demanded * *
i ji ij
z t M  , the level 
of production * *
i ijj
y t  and the price    
1 1* *
i i i i jij
p a a M a t 
 
    . 
The last step in solving the problem consists of finding the minimum access level iM  that 
maximizes the total welfare of both regions. The problem is defined as follows:   
 
   
1,2
* * * * * * * *
i i
i i i i j ij i i ij ij i w ii j jM
max W U z p z p t g y c t p p M

       
      (13) 
In the problem defined by equation  (13), the functional form of the utility function is given by 
equation (6). The first-order condition is: 
     1(1/ 9) 4 1 0i i w
i
W
a c g a M p
M
 

      

   (= 0 for 0iM  ) (14) 
By solving (14), it is possible to determine the optimal minimum access level for region i: 
   * 4 1 9i i wM a a c g p        (15) 
According to (15), the region with a larger market will receive a larger portion of the import 
under the minimum access commitment.
15
  
The optimal minimum access level of the country is the sum of the minimum access of both 
regions: 
     * 1 4 1 9 wM a a c g p         (16) 
                                                 
15
 This situation is observed in Canada, where, for most production under supply management, imports are largely 
directed to the most populated province, Ontario. See http://cansim2.statcan.gc.ca/cgi-
win/CNSMCGI.PGM?Lang=E&CIMT_Action=Sections&ResultTemplate=CII_CIMT5. Site consulted June 4, 2013. 
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Based on (12), we deduce the following market conditions under which interregional trade is 
possible ( 0, 1,2 1,2ijt i  et j    ): 
  
  
  
  
11 1
12 2
21 1
22 2
0  if  2
For region  1:  
0  if  2
0  if  2
For region 2 :  
0  if  2
t M a a g g c
t M a a g c g
t M a a g c g
t M a a g g c

 

 
     

    
     

             
(17) 
Based on (17), we can deduce the most restrictive conditions on 1M  and 2M , which are 
respectively max
1 1M M  and 
max
2 2M M  with: 
  
  
  
max
1
max
2
2   
2   
2
a a g c g if g g c
M
a a g g c if g g c
M a a g c g
 
 
 
     

     
   
  
Using the optimal minimum access level solution given by equation (15) and result (17), we 
show that local sales in a region i and interregional trade from region  i  to region j are possible 
only if the international price exceeds a level that depends not only on the marginal production 
cost of region i, iCm , but also on the marginal cost of region j, jCm , and the transaction cost, c. 
This result is summarized by proposition 1, the proof of which is found in Appendix 1. 
 
Proposition 1.  
Let iCm  be the marginal cost of production in region i,  1,2i   and c the transaction 
cost.  Local sales in a region i  0 1,2iit i    and interregional trade 
 0 ; 1,2 ; 1,2ijt i j i j        are possible only if  
1
2 2
3
w i j  p Cm Cm c   . 
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Corollary 1 presents the implications of proposition 1 in terms of trade flow between the regions.  
 
Corollary 1  
Given the parameter of production cost asymmetry between the two regions defined by 
2 1Cm Cm  ,  
(i) Exports from the region with the highest costs to the region with the lowest costs is 
possible  12 0t    if and  only if    
1
1 13 2wCm p Cm c

     . 
(ii) Exports from the region with the lowest costs to the region with the highest costs is 
possible  21 0t  if and  only if    
1
1 10.5 3 2wCm p Cm c

     . 
 
The most restrictive condition presented in Corollary 1 concerns sales from the region with the 
highest production costs to the region with the lowest production costs. In this case, trade from 
region 1 to region 2 is possible  12 0t    only if the following condition on the international 
price is met:  
1
2 2
3
w p g g c   . In this case, the optimal minimum access level chosen for 
each region is defined by (15). For each region i the following conditions must be met *
i wp p , 
which occurs when  
2 1
3 3
wp g c  g   .
16
 Under this condition, the production cost 
asymmetry must be such that      with   1 3 2wg p g c
      . Therefore, exporting 
                                                 
16
 The solution of the model gives identical prices in both regions, namely:  * 3 1
i wp p g c    . 
Condition
*
i wp p  which implies  1 2 1 2wp g g c    is verified given that    2 3 1 3wp g c  g   . 
 13 
from the region with the highest costs to the region with the lowest costs is possible  12 0t    
only if the gain from production efficiency of region 2 relative to region 1 ( 2
1
Cm
Cm
  ) is 
markedly lower than the difference between the gain from the fluctuation in the international 
price relative to the marginal cost of region 1 represented by 
1
wp
Cm
 and the gain from the 
fluctuation in the transaction cost relative to the marginal cost in the same region 
 1
1
Cm c
Cm

. 
Corollary 1 implies that, all things being equal, the reduction in transaction costs increases the 
likelihood that the region with the highest production costs exports to the region with the lowest 
costs if the latter region exports to the first region. The reduction in transaction costs makes the 
constraint less restrictive given that 0c   . It is therefore possible to define bilateral trade 
zones according to the value of transaction costs (c). Figure 2.a represents the zone in which 
there is trade between the regions, according to transaction costs. The decrease of world price 
eases the constraint given that 0wp   . Figure 2.b presents the zone in which there is 
bilateral trade between regions, according to world price.   
 
We will now examine the effect on welfare of the increase in minimum access.
17
 Figure 3 shows 
that the total welfare in both regions increases as the minimum access in each region rises to the 
optimal level.  Beyond the optimal minimum access level, total welfare decreases until it reaches 
                                                 
17
 The Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and European Union is an example of 
an increase in minimum access. Under the deal principle of the CETA, EU producers will be able to ship additional 
cheese into Canada while Canadian beef producers will be eligible for new quota access into the European Union. 
See at http://www.actionplan.gc.ca/en/page/ceta-aecg/agreement-overview (Accessed October 29, 2013). 
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a level that corresponds to minimum access levels max
1M  and  
max
2M . The variation in welfare 
depends on the variation in producer and consumer surplus, along with permit holders’ rent.   
The impact of minimum access on the producer surplus is illustrated in Figure 4. An increase in 
minimum access in region 1 decreases the demand that the local producer faces, which lowers 
the price and quantity produced, and consequently decreases the producer’s surplus. Further, an 
increase in minimum access level in region 2 reduces the sales of region 1 on the market of 
region 2. This decrease in sales lowers the producer surplus and the welfare of region 1. Figure 5 
shows the impact of minimum access on consumer surplus. An increase in minimum access 
decreases the price paid by consumers, and consequently improves their welfare.   
We analyze in greater detail the impact of minimum access level on import permit holders’ rent 
and the level of welfare in region 1. The results are presented in the following proposition, the 
proof of which appears in Appendix 2. 
 
Proposition 2. 
Let *
1M  be the optimal minimum access level and 1
RM  the import level that maximizes permit 
holders’ rent in region 1. The difference between *
1M and 1
RM is: 
(i) strictly positive when        
1 1
7 1 , 4 1
15 9
wp a c g a c g 
 
       
 
 
(ii) strictly negative when    
1
0, 7 1
15
wp a c g
 
    
 
 
(iii) zero when    
1
7 1
15
wp a c g     
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According to proposition 2, there is a level of world price for which the interests of import 
permit holders coincide with the objective of maximizing total welfare (condition (iii)). Figure 6 
illustrates the impact of the increase in minimum access in both regions on permit holders’ rent 
(PHR1) and welfare (W1) of region 1, for different intervals of world price.   
 
Figure 6.a shows that an increase in minimum access between *
1M  and 1
RM decreases the total 
welfare of region 1. This is explained by the negative effect of increasing minimum access on the 
producer surplus, which outweighs the positive effect of the increase in minimum access on 
consumer surplus and permit holders’ rent. Beyond 1
RM level, any increase in minimum access 
level lowers the producer surplus and the permit holders’ rent. Figure 6.b illustrates the case 
where the interests of import permit holders coincide with the objective of maximizing global 
welfare. In this case, an increase in minimum access beyond its optimal level decreases permit 
holders’ rent and the producer surplus, which outweighs the increase in consumer surplus. The 
final effect is a decrease in total welfare. Figure 6.c illustrates the last case, where the minimum 
access level maximizing the welfare of region 1 exceeds the minimum access level maximizing 
permit holders’ rent. In this case, the decrease in permit holders’ rent and producer surplus, 
between 1
RM and *1M , does not exceed the increase in consumer surplus. The net effect is a rise 
in total welfare. Beyond *1M level, the decrease in producer surplus and permit holders’ rent is 
greater than the increase in consumer surplus; total welfare thus decreases in region 1. 
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4. Exporting from the most efficient to the least efficient region   
Now, we examine the situation where the producer from region 2 acts like a monopoly on the 
market of its region and competes à la Cournot on the market of region 1. We therefore have 
11 0t  , 12 0t  , 21 0t   and 22 0t  . This situation is observable if condition (2) of proposition 1 is 
not met, that is:  
2 1
3 3
wp g c  g   . The solution to the problem of maximizing the 
producer’s profit can determine the sales solutions: 
 For region 1:
   *11 1
*
12
2 / 3
0
t a a g g c M
t
     


  (18) 
 For region 2:
   
  
*
21 1
*
22 2
2 / 3
/ 2
t a a g c g M
t a a g M

 
     

  
  (19) 
new conditions on sales according to minimum access level are as follows: 
 For region 1:
  
  
11 1
12 2
0 2
0 2
t   if  M a a g g c
t   if  M a a g c g

 
     

    
  (20) 
 For region 2:
  21 1
22 2
0 2
0 ( )
t   if  M a a g c g
t  if  M a a g   

 
     

  
  (21) 
 
The solutions to the problem must satisfy conditions (20) and (21), which give us the conditions 
for which there is unilateral interregional trade from region 2 to region 1, whereas the inverse is 
not true. This result is explained in Corollary 2.  
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Corollary 2: 
Exporting from the region with the lowest costs to that with the highest costs is possible 
 21 0t   ,  whereas the inverse is impossible   12 0t    only if the productive efficiency of 
region 2 relative to that of region 1 is such that  
       
1 1
1 1 1 1
3 1
3 2
2 2
w wCm p Cm c < < Cm p Cm c
  
      
 
 with 2
1
Cm
Cm
  . 
 
Figures 2.a and 2.b in Section 2 present the zone in which the region with the lowest production 
costs exports to the region with the highest costs, according to the transaction costs and world 
price respectively.   
The solution of the first-order conditions of the maximization problem of the total welfare of the 
two regions gives us the optimal solutions of 1M  and 2M :   
   *1 4 1 9 wM a a c g p         (22) 
 *2 3 4 wM a a g p         (23) 
The optimal minimum access of both regions is therefore:  
       * 4 9 4 1 4 1 3wM a c p a g             (24) 
This will be effective for *
i wp p  (See Appendix 3). In addition, proposition 3 below shows that 
according to the world price and cost asymmetry, the largest region, even if it is also the most 
efficient, can receive a greater portion of minimum access. Low prices and/or relatively high 
production costs justify consumer sourcing through imports. The proof of proposition 3 is 
presented in Appendix 4. 
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Proposition 3 
Let 
 4 5
0
3 4
w
w
g c g p
a g p



  
 
 
 and   be the size asymmetry parameter between the regions. 
The largest and most efficient region is the one that:   
(i) receives the smallest share of minimum access if  1 ,  1    
(ii)  receives the same minimum access share as the other region if 1    
(iii) receives the highest share of minimum access if  1  ,      .      
 
From the definition of parameter   it is possible to see that the greater the cost asymmetry, the 
more it will be necessary, all things being equal, that the difference in size be significant for a 
greater minimum access level to be allocated to the large region  0    . This result is 
intuitive given that the large region is also the most efficient. Further, all things being equal, 
given that  0wp   , the lower the world price, and the smaller the size differences, the more 
likely the larger region will be to receive a larger share of permits. Lastly, given that 0c   , 
the higher the transaction costs, the more a large size difference will be necessary for the larger 
region to receive a larger share of import permits. All things being equal, the large region does 
not find it profitable to export a portion of its production toward the smaller region.   
 
5. Optimal minimum access with absence of trade between regions 
In this situation there is no interregional trade, and each producer acts like a monopoly on the 
market of its region. We therefore have: 11 0t  , 12 0t  , 21 0t   et 22 0t  . Then, optimal solutions 
must uniquely satisfy the first condition of proposition 1 on the existence of trade on each local 
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market, whereas the second condition of the same proposition on the presence of trade between 
the regions becomes:   
 For region 1:  12
2 1
0 
3 3
wt   si  p g c  g       (25) 
 For region 2:  21
1 2
0
3 3
wt   si  p g g c                   (26)   
   
The most constraining condition is that given by equation (26), which concerns the aptitude of 
the least efficient region to supply the market of the most efficient region. It is possible to 
conclude that in the case where g g c   and  
1 2
3 3
wg p g g c    , we have 
11 0t  , 12 0t  , 21 0t   and 22 0t  . The condition g g c   implies that the lowest marginal 
production cost in region 2 does not suffice to compensate for the costs associated with transport 
costs, whereas the second condition takes global market conditions into account. This result is 
summarized in corollary 3. 
 
Corollary 3 
For the minimum access levels allocated to each region not to give rise to interprovincial trade, 
the cost asymmetry between the two regions must satisfy the following condition:  
   
1
1 13 2wCm p Cm c

      with 
2
1
Cm
Cm
  .      
 
Figures 2.a and 2.b present the zone in which there is no trade between the regions, according to 
transaction costs and world price respectively. Lastly, the optimal minimum access level chosen 
for each region is effective because *
i wp p  (See Appendix 5).  
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We obtain the following solutions to the problem of maximizing the producer profit in each 
region: 
 For region 1:
  *11 1
*
12
/ 2
0
t a a g M
t
   


      (27) 
 For region 2:
  
*
21
*
22 2
0
/ 2
t
t a a g M 
 

  
      (28)  
 
The new conditions on sales according to the minimum access level are:   
 For region 1:  11 10 t   if  M a a g          (29) 
 For region 2:  22 20t   if  M a a g         (30)  
The solutions of 1M  and 2M  that maximize the total welfare of both regions issuing from the 
first-order conditions are:   
 *1 3 4 wM a a g p     (31) 
 *2 3 4 wM a a g p      (32) 
and the optimal minimum access level of the set of both regions is:  
      * 1 4 1 3 1wM a a p g         (33) 
Equations (31) and (32) imply that when the production costs of both regions are symmetrical 
 1  , the region with the greatest market size receives a higher volume of imports eligible 
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under the  minimum access system.
18
 In the case of symmetrical demand  1  , the region with 
the lowest marginal cost will have a smaller share of imports.
19
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
The prevalence of import quotas in several countries and different economic sectors has 
generated rich literature. In Canada and the European Union,  import management under tariff-
rate quotas not only entails assigning eligible imports under the minimum access commitment to 
different provinces/countries, but also production control to guarantee a sufficiently high 
domestic price level. National production is allocated to different regions, each of which must 
mainly supply on its local market. However, the data on exchanges between provinces/countries 
show that in several cases, producers do not supply local markets exclusively.  In Canada, this 
has led to conflicts between provincial administration bodies of productions under supply 
management, and to attempts to put in place trade barriers between provinces, which contradicts 
the current trend of encouraging a reduction in domestic trade barriers.
20
  
This paper is based on the bilateral dumping model of Brander and Krugman (1983) in which 
trade can exist even in the absence of a comparative advantage of a given region. Reciprocal 
dumping is the outcome of a non-cooperative game that enhances competition while creating 
sourcing inefficiencies because increases in consumption are supported by purchases subject to 
transport costs. 
                                                 
18
 Based on equations (31) and (32)  it is possible to verify that M  depends only on the value of   and if 
 1    then  * *1 2M M  . 
19
 Based on equations (31) and (32), we have:  3 1 0M ag     , which implies * *1 2M M . 
20
 See the Agreement on Internal Trade at http://www.ait-aci.ca/index_en/intro.htm. Accessed September 11, 2013.  
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We derive the conditions under which it is optimal to observe interregional trade and those under 
which trade does not exist. World price and differing production costs between regions are very 
influential here. In the presence of bilateral trade, the region with the largest market size will 
obtain the largest share of import volumes permitted under the minimum access system. When 
only the most efficient region exports to the least efficient region, world price, production cost 
asymmetry and transaction costs also play important roles in the issuing of import permits. The 
larger economy will not necessarily receive the largest volume of import permits. In the absence 
of interregional trade, the distribution of import permits between regions depends on the product 
cost asymmetry parameters and market size.   
In terms of public policy, our results imply that even if in general countries that make minimum 
access commitments allocate their production between regions such that trade is strictly 
minimized, it is not optimal to create trade barriers between regions/countries. “Artificial” trade 
barriers between different regions/countries will contribute to reducing the welfare of at least one 
of the regions, along with global welfare. Without these barriers, world price and productivity 
gains observed in different regions would determine efficient adjustments to trade flows between 
regions/countries.   
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Figure 1.a. Interprovincial trade in shell eggs Figure 1.b. Interprovincial trade in live chickens 
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Figure 2.a. Effect of transaction costs and cost 
asymmetry parameter on regions’ capacity to trade 
with each other   
Figure 2.b. Effect of world price and cost 
asymmetry parameter on regions’ capacity to trade 
with each other 
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Figure 3. Impact of minimum access on welfare of the two regions 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Impact of minimum access on producer surplus in region 1 
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Figure 5. Impact of minimum access on consumer surplus in region 1 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Impact of minimum access level on welfare and import permit holders’ rent in region 1 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1.Proof of proposition 1 
According to this case, there is no corner solution: all sales are observed.  Optimal quota 
solutions must satisfy the conditions of (17), which let us obtain the following  conditions: 
For region 1: 
 11
2 1
0 
3 3
t   if  pw g g c            (34) 
 12
2 1
0 
3 3
t   if  pw g c  g            (35) 
For region 2: 
 21
1 2
0
3 3
t   if  pw g g c              (36) 
 22
1 2
0
3 3
t   if  pw g c g            (37) 
Condition (35) is the most restrictive. If it is satisfied then 11 0t  , 12 0t  , 21 0t   and 22 0t  . If 
the optimal quota chosen for each region *
iM ,  for all 1,2 i  , is defined by (15) and it is 
effective for *
ip pw . Further, the solution of the model gives identical prices in both regions, 
namely:  * 3 1ip pw g c    . Condition:
*
ip pw , which implies  
1 1
2 2
pw g g c    
because condition  
2 1
3 3
pw g c  g    is the most restrictive. 
 
Appendix 2. Proof of proposition 2 
Import permit holders in region 1 maximize their rent: 
 
1
*
1 1max w
M
p p M  
 
1
1
1
3
max
3M
a a c g pw g M
M
a
     
 
 
 
The maximum rent for a value of imports to region 1 that verifies the following equation: 
  1
1
3 2
:       0
3
a a c g pw g M
M
a
    

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This gives the solution:   
  1
1
1 3
2
RM a a c g pw      
We therefore have:  
 1 0 / 3
RM  if  pw a c g g       (38) 
The minimum access level that maximizes total welfare is: 
   *1 1 4 1 9 wM a a c g p       
   *1 0 4 1 / 9M  if  pw a c g       (39) 
Condition  (39) is more restrictive than condition (38): 
    
1
9 4 1 3
2
wp c g pw c g g pw g g c              (40) 
Condition  (40) is less restrictive than condition  
1
2 2
3
w p g g c    , which is defined in   
proposition 1:    
1 1
2 2
2 3
g g c g g c g g c          .  
Let us now calculate the difference, *
1 1
RM M : 
 *1 1 1 7 7 15 7
2
R R aM M M a c g pw g         
We can conclude that: 
   
       
   
1
1
1
1
0 0, 7 1
15
1 1
0 7 1 , 4 1
15 9
1
0 7 1
15
R
w
R
w
R
w
M  if  p a c g
M  if  p a c g a c g
M if  p a c g

 

  
       
 
  
          
 

     

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Appendix 3. Condition of efficiency of optimal minimum access when the most efficient 
region exports to the least efficient region   
The price in region 1 is:  *1 3 1wp p g c     
*
1 wp p  which implies that 
 
1 1
2 2
wg g c p   . This condition is satisfied for g g c   because 
   1 2 1 2 2 3 1 3g g c g g c       and in the case where g g c   because 
   1 2 1 2 1 3 2 3g g c g g c      . Therefore, we can conclude that the minimum access 
level of region 1 is effective regardless of  g    g c  . In region 2, the equilibrium price is 
*
2 2 wp p g   
*
2 wp p  which implies that wg p  . This condition is satisfied when 
g g c   because  2 3 1 3g g g c     and in the case where g g c   because 
 1 3 2 3g g g c    . It is therefore possible to conclude that the minimum access level of 
region 2 is effective regardless of g    g c  . 
 
Appendix 4. Proof of proposition 3 
Let us define by M  the difference between the optimal minimum access level for region 1 and 
that of  region 2:  
       * *1 2 1 4 4 9 4 1 3wM M M a a c p g               (41) 
Based on (41), it is possible to show that * *
1 2M M  only when 1    with 
 4 5
0
3 4
w
w
g c g p
a g p



  
 
 
. Accordingly,  4 5 0wg c g p     and 3 4 0wa g p    
because  4 5 0wg c g p    , which implies that  4 5 1 5wp g c g   . However, the 
condition  2 3 1 3wp g c g    is more restrictive:     2 3 1 3 4 5 1 5g c g g c g       
which implies that g c g  . The optimal access level in region 2, *2M , must be strictly 
positive: *
2 0M  , which implies that 3 4 0wa g p   . 
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Appendix 5. Condition of efficiency of optimal minimum access when there is no trade 
between regions 
The price in region 1 is *
1 2 wp p g   and we have 
*
1 wp p , which implies that wg p  
because  1 3 2 3wg p g g c    . In region 2, the equilibrium price is 
*
2 2 wp p g   and 
*
2 wp p , which implies that wg p  because g g   and  1 3 2 3wg p g g c    . 
 
 
